



# Fairness in Machine Learning



ML algorithms have failed to uphold basic notions of fairness throughout the history of machine learning

# Language models

## Goal:

- Learning word associations
- Applications:
  - Complete sentences
  - Find synonyms
  - Word analogies: “a is to b as x is to y”

**Ex:** word2vec. i) Computes distance between any pair of words, then ii) embeds in it a 2 or 3D space




# Word2vec – word analogies

Ex: “Paris is to France like  is to Italy”

# Word2vec – word analogies

Ex: “Paris is to France like **Rome** is to Italy”



# Word2vec – word analogies

2016: T. Bolukbasi, K-W Chang, Zou, Saligrama, Kalai  
Started investigating failures of the word2vec model

Used word2vec to make analogies across genders:

# Word2vec – word analogies

2016: T. Bolukbasi, K-W Chang, Zou, Saligrama, Kalai  
Started investigating failures of the word2vec model

Used word2vec to make analogies across genders:

- “Man is to X as woman is to Y”



# Word2vec – word analogies

2016: T. Bolukbasi, K-W Chang, Zou, Saligrama, Kalai  
Started investigating failures of the word2vec model

Used word2vec to make analogies across genders:

- “Man is to X as woman is to Y”
- Set X = “Computer Programmer”

# Word2vec – word analogies

2016: T. Bolukbasi, K-W Chang, Zou, Saligrama, Kalai  
Started investigating failures of the word2vec model

Used word2vec to make analogies across genders:

- “Man is to X as woman is to Y”
- Set X = “Computer Programmer”
- Y = “Homemaker”

# Word2vec – word analogies

2016: T. Bolukbasi, K-W Chang, Zou, Saligrama, Kalai  
Started investigating failures of the word2vec model

Used word2vec to make analogies across genders:

- “Man is to X as woman is to Y”
- Set X = “Computer Programmer”
- Y = “Homemaker”

“Man is to Computer Programmer as Woman is to Homemaker?  
Debiasing Word Embeddings”

# Man is to Computer Programmer as Woman is to Homemaker?

## **Extreme *she* occupations**

- |                 |                       |                        |
|-----------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1. homemaker    | 2. nurse              | 3. receptionist        |
| 4. librarian    | 5. socialite          | 6. hairdresser         |
| 7. nanny        | 8. bookkeeper         | 9. stylist             |
| 10. housekeeper | 11. interior designer | 12. guidance counselor |

## **Extreme *he* occupations**

- |                |                   |                |
|----------------|-------------------|----------------|
| 1. maestro     | 2. skipper        | 3. protege     |
| 4. philosopher | 5. captain        | 6. architect   |
| 7. financier   | 8. warrior        | 9. broadcaster |
| 10. magician   | 11. fighter pilot | 12. boss       |

# Man is to Computer Programmer as Woman is to Homemaker?

## Gender stereotype *she-he* analogies.

sewing-carpentry

nurse-surgeon

blond-burly

giggle-chuckle

sassy-snappy

volleyball-football

register-nurse-physician

interior designer-architect

feminism-conservatism

vocalist-guitarist

diva-superstar

cupcakes-pizzas

housewife-shopkeeper

softball-baseball

cosmetics-pharmaceuticals

petite-lanky

charming-affable

hairstylist-barber

# What's the harm?

Language models can be used to make decisions about individuals, and in turn can be discriminatory

- **Amazon tried building an artificial-intelligence tool to help with recruiting, but it showed a bias against women, [Reuters reports](#).**

---

- **Engineers reportedly found the AI was unfavorable toward female candidates because it had combed through male-dominated résumés to accrue its data.**

# What's the harm?

Language models can be used to make decisions about individuals, and in turn can be discriminatory

- **Amazon tried building an artificial-intelligence tool to help with recruiting, but it showed a bias against women, [Reuters reports](#).**

---

- **Engineers reportedly found the AI was unfavorable toward female candidates because it had combed through male-dominated résumés to accrue its data.**

# Facial recognition






# Facial recognition



# Facial recognition



# Facial recognition





Figure 1: Auditing five face recognition technologies. The *Gender Shades project* revealed *discrepancies* in the classification accuracy of face recognition technologies for different skin tones and sexes. These algorithms consistently demonstrated the poorest accuracy for darker-skinned females and the highest for lighter-skinned males.



# Facial recognition – why does this happen?



# Facial recognition – why does this happen?

But many assigned descriptions, which were crowdsourced using human workers via Amazon's platform Mechanical Turk, are deeply disturbing. "Bad person," "hypocrite," "loser," "drug addict," "debtor," and "wimp" are all categories, and within each category there are images of people, scraped from Flickr and other social media sites and used without their consent. More insidiously, ImageNet also has categories like "workers" and "leaders," which are socio-historical categories that look incredibly different across different cultures—if they exist at all. There's no way to know who actually labeled each image, let alone assess what each person's individual biases are that may have informed the labels.

# Facial recognition bias and consequences

Facial recognition is used today by:

- Airport and airline screening
- Public housing
- Employers
- Law enforcement
- Military drones

Since facial recognition algorithms are unfair, the harm that results from using them are disparate

**Ex:** arresting criminals based on facial recognition

# Facial recognition bias can have big consequences


These algorithmic biases have major real-life implications. Several levels of law enforcement and [U.S. Customs and Border Protection](#) use facial recognition technology to support policing and airport screenings, respectively. This technology sometimes determines who receives housing or employment offers. One analyst at the [American Civil Liberties Union](#) reportedly warned that false matches “can lead to missed flights, lengthy interrogations, watch list placements, tense police encounters, false arrests, or worse.” Even if developers can make the algorithms equitable, some advocates fear that law enforcement will employ the technology in a discriminatory manner, disproportionately harming marginalized populations.

# Facial recognition bias can have big consequences





After Detroit police arrested Robert Williams for another person's crime, officers reportedly showed him the surveillance video image of another Black man that they had used to identify Williams. The image prompted him to ask the officers if they thought "all Black men look alike." Police falsely arrested Williams after facial recognition technology matched him to the image of a suspect—an image that Williams maintains did not look like him.



# Algorithms in criminal justice: COMPAS



# Algorithms in criminal justice: COMPAS

Two Petty Theft Arrests		Two Petty Theft Arrests	
			
<b>VERNON PRATER</b>	<b>BRISHA BORDEN</b>	<b>VERNON PRATER</b>	<b>BRISHA BORDEN</b>
<b>Prior Offenses</b> 2 armed robberies, 1 attempted armed robbery	<b>Prior Offenses</b> 4 juvenile misdemeanors	<b>Prior Offenses</b> 2 armed robberies, 1 attempted armed robbery	<b>Prior Offenses</b> 4 juvenile misdemeanors
<b>Subsequent Offenses</b> 1 grand theft	<b>Subsequent Offenses</b> None	<b>Subsequent Offenses</b> 1 grand theft	<b>Subsequent Offenses</b> None
<b>LOW RISK</b> <b>3</b>	<b>HIGH RISK</b> <b>8</b>	<b>LOW RISK</b> <b>3</b>	<b>HIGH RISK</b> <b>8</b>
<p>Borden was rated high risk for future crime after she and a friend took a kid's bike and scooter that were sitting outside. She did not reoffend.</p>		<p>Borden was rated high risk for future crime after she and a friend took a kid's bike and scooter that were sitting outside. She did not reoffend.</p>	

# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

Algorithms are a big part of loan/mortgage/credit decisions today

Loan decisions are biased:

At equal financial situation, people of color are less likely to get the same loan/mortgage.


Why?

- Historically, loan decisions have been racist → biased training data
- Algorithms can learn to mimic that human bias/racism



# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

Redlining




# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

## Applicants of color denied at higher rates

To illustrate the odds of denial our analysis revealed, this is how many people of each race/ethnic group would likely be denied if 100 similarly qualified applicants applied for mortgages in **the United States**

---

5 White applicants denied



7 Latino applicants denied



7 Asian/Pacific Islander applicants denied



8 Native American applicants denied




9 Black applicants denied



# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

## Racial disparity remains



Note: Approval rates controlled for income  
Source: Clever Real Estate and HMDA

■ Black  
■ White

# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

Loan algorithms not only perpetuate bias...

# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

Loan algorithms not only perpetuate bias...

... But they can also amplify it



# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

Loan algorithms not only perpetuate bias...

... But they can also amplify it

Less likely to approve loans for people of color

→ get little data about likeliness to repay loan

→ makes approving loans for POCs risky and “undesirable”

*missing label problem*

# Algorithms in loan/mortgage decisions

Loan algorithms not only perpetuate bias...

... But they can also amplify it


Less likely to approve loans for people of color

→ get little data about likeliness to repay loan

→ makes approving loans for POCs risky and “undesirable”

Vicious cycle/feedback loop → less and less fairness over time

# Predictive policing: PredPol



# Predictive policing & bad feedback loops

Racist data showing more people of colors arrested in the past

- ➔ Spend more police resources in areas with more POCs
- ➔ Arrest more POCs (not necessarily because of higher crime rate, but higher detection rate)

# Predictive policing & bad feedback loops


Racist data showing more people of colors arrested in the past

- ➔ Spend more police resources in areas with more POCs
- ➔ Arrest more POCs (not necessarily because of higher crime rate, but higher detection rate)


Predictive policing algorithms can get stuck in negative feedback loops that allocate more to certain areas independently of crime rates

*missing label problem again*

# Predictive policing & bad feedback loops





Drug arrests made by the Oakland Police Department, 2010




Estimated number of drug users, based on 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health

“To predict and serve?” Kristian Lum, William Isaac

# Predictive policing & bad feedback loops



Populations targeted by PredPol



Estimated drug use

“To predict and serve?” Kristian Lum, William Isaac



# Big Data in College Admission Marketing

So the university started to dig deeper for prospects in its backyard, purchasing more names of prospective high-school students from the College Board and ACT and targeting those teenagers with marketing materials. At one point, admissions officials at Saint Louis University were buying upwards of 250,000 names annually.

“We approached searching for students the way most schools did at the time,” said Jay Goff, the university’s vice president for enrollment and retention management. “We would take the demographics of the previous year’s freshman class and try to purchase more names that matched them the following year.”



# Big Data in College Admission Marketing

So the university started to dig deeper for prospects in its backyard, purchasing more names of prospective high-school students from the College Board and ACT and targeting those teenagers with marketing materials. At one point, admissions officials at Saint Louis University were buying upwards of 250,000 names annually.

“We approached searching for students the way most schools did at the time,” said Jay Goff, the university’s vice president for enrollment and retention management. “We would take the demographics of the previous year’s freshman class and try to purchase more names that matched them the following year.”

- Targeting majority population
- More applicants from majority population
- More admitted students from majority population
- Target the majority population more

Why is fairness not “trivial”?

# What is even the right notion of fairness?

Two legal doctrines in the U.S.:

**Disparate Treatment**

vs

**Disparate Impact**

# What is even the right notion of fairness?

Two legal doctrines in the U.S.:

## **Disparate Treatment**

vs

## **Disparate Impact**

- Intentional discrimination
- Taking race into account in decisions

# What is even the right notion of fairness?

Two legal doctrines in the U.S.:

## **Disparate Treatment**

- Intentional discrimination
- Taking race into account in decisions

vs

## **Disparate Impact**

- Avoidable harm or discrimination
- Possibly indirect

# What is even the right notion of fairness?

Two legal doctrines in the U.S.:

**Disparate Treatment**

vs

**Disparate Impact**

But disparate treatment and impact are often incompatible!

# (Un)fairness through unawareness

Common critique:

“Fairness should be easy. How can it be unfair if we do not take sensitive attributes like race into account?”



# (Un)fairness through unawareness

## Common critique:

“Fairness should be easy. How can it be unfair if we do not take sensitive attributes like race into account?”


## Issue #1:

- Algorithms are never truly “race-blind” or “unaware”
- Correlation across features can reveal information about sensitive attribute, even if sensitive attribute is not explicitly used

# (Un)fairness through unawareness

Common critique:

“Fairness should be easy. How can it be unfair if we do not take sensitive attributes like race into account?”



Back to redlining example:

- Can use zip code/etc. as a proxy for race
- Even if race is hidden, can use zip code to discriminate

# (Un)fairness through unawareness

## Common critique:

“Fairness should be easy. How can it be unfair if we do not take sensitive attributes like race into account?”

## Issue #2:

- Observed features are only proxies for someone’s “true” attributes
- Same value for a given observed feature may have different meanings across different populations, and cannot be treated the same


# (Un)fairness through unawareness

## Common critique:

“Fairness should be easy. How can it be unfair if we do not take sensitive attributes like race into account?”

### SAT: Student Affluence Test

Average scores on each section of SAT (and combined) by parental income



Source: FairTest, College Board | WSJ.com

# (Un)fairness through unawareness

## Common critique:

“Fairness should be easy. How can it be unfair if we do not take sensitive attributes like race into account?”

## Why would wealthier populations have advantages on SAT?

- Access to better preparation for SAT → higher scores at everything else equal
- Can take the SAT several times, until get desired score

So to design “fair” algorithms, we often need to take fairness explicitly into account...

# Many possible sources of unfairness

Previous examples showed different reasons for unfairness:

- **Data bias** (probably the most obvious one)




# Sources of unfairness:

Previous examples showed different reasons for unfairness:

- Data bias
- Imbalance in the quantity of data across groups

# Sources of unfairness: data imbalance



# Sources of unfairness

Previous examples showed different reasons for unfairness:

- Data bias
- Imbalance in the quantity of data across groups
- Only access to proxies rather than true, intrinsic attributes

# Sources of unfairness: proxies

## ECONOMICS

### Dissecting racial bias in an algorithm used to manage the health of populations

Ziad Obermeyer<sup>1,2\*</sup>, Brian Powers<sup>3</sup>, Christine Vogeli<sup>4</sup>, Sendhil Mullainathan<sup>5\*†</sup>

Health systems rely on commercial prediction algorithms to identify and help patients with complex health needs. We show that a widely used algorithm, typical of this industry-wide approach and affecting millions of patients, exhibits significant racial bias: At a given risk score, Black patients are considerably sicker than White patients, as evidenced by signs of uncontrolled illnesses. Remedying this disparity would increase the percentage of Black patients receiving additional help from 17.7 to 46.5%. The bias arises because the algorithm predicts health care costs rather than illness, but unequal access to care means that we spend less money caring for Black patients than for White patients. Thus, despite health care cost appearing to be an effective proxy for health by some measures of predictive accuracy, large racial biases arise. We suggest that the choice of convenient, seemingly effective proxies for ground truth can be an important source of algorithmic bias in many contexts.

# Sources of unfairness

Previous examples showed different reasons for unfairness:

- Data bias
- Imbalance in the quantity of data across groups
- Only access to proxies rather than true, intrinsic attributes
- Learning objective causes unanticipated bias

# Sources of unfairness: learning objective

## Example 1: ad auction

- Two type of agents: A and B.
- Advertiser 1 has value  $(1,1)$ , advertiser 2  $(0,1.1)$ . Single ad slot.

# Sources of unfairness: learning objective

## Example 1: ad auction

- Two type of agents: A and B.
- Advertiser 1 has value  $(1,1)$ , advertiser 2  $(0,1.1)$ . Single ad slot.

## Objective: max social welfare

- If type = A, allocate to advertiser 1
- If type = B, allocate to advertiser 2



# Sources of unfairness: learning objective

## Example 1: ad auction

- Two type of agents: A and B.
- Advertiser 1 has value (1,1), advertiser 2 (0,1.1). Single ad slot.

## Objective: max social welfare

- If type = A, allocate to advertiser 1
- If type = B, allocate to advertiser 2

A = male, B = female; advertiser 1 = higher ed, ad 2 = maternity clothes

# Sources of unfairness


Previous examples showed different reasons for unfairness:

- Data bias
- Imbalance in the quantity of data across groups
- Only access to proxies rather than true, intrinsic attributes
- Learning objective causes unanticipated bias
- Feedback loops/long-term and composed effects

# Sources of unfairness: feedback loops

## Wealth Disparity Blows Out

Difference, per-household wealth of the 1% and Bottom 50%



Source: Federal Reserve, Census Bureau

WOLFSTREET.com

“The rich get richer”

More wealth

- ➔ better access to better loans or mortgages
- ➔ more wealth

# Sources of unfairness

Previous examples showed different reasons for unfairness:

- Data bias
- Imbalance in the quantity of data across groups
- Only access to proxies rather than true, intrinsic attributes
- Learning objective causes unanticipated bias
- Feedback loops/long-term and composed effects
- Possibly many other reasons...

Fairness issues do not simply arise at the algorithmic level, and algorithms probably cannot solve all fairness issues...

...But algorithms are widely used in important life decisions, and we should strive to make them as fair as possible

# *Algorithmic Fairness*

How can we prevent our algorithms for making unfair decisions, and mimicking or perpetuating bias?